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Possible Implications of Cognitive Neuroscience for 
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Rhonda Blair
Theatre and research models generally follow paradigms of science and 
culture, and a number of scholars have considered how scientiﬁc and technological 
shifts have affected our understanding of theatre and performance. For example, 
Philip Auslander addresses the impact of electronic media on our understanding 
of liveness and authenticity in Liveness,1 and Jon McKenzie examines the impact 
of new technologies in a range of ﬁelds in Perform or Else.2 Most pertinent to my 
project is Joseph Roach’s excellent and invaluable The Player’s Passion:  Studies 
in the Science of Acting,3 which traces the effect of changing scientiﬁc paradigms 
on how we have understood the actor’s process, taking us through mechanist, 
vitalist, biological, and psychological perspectives ranging from the behavioral to 
the psychoanalytic, each of which held currency in its own time, but which was 
superseded by the next wave of research. Interestingly, by the time Roach’s work 
was published, ﬁrst in 1985 and then in 1993, research was underway in the cognitive 
and neurosciences that was calling into question basic aspects of consciousness, 
cognition, and brain function that is again redeﬁning our sense of the actor’s 
process. My particular interest is in the cognitive neurosciences, which look at the 
biological ground and processes of cognition and behavior; discoveries in these 
ﬁelds are raising questions about basic elements of the theatrical event, among 
them the nature of the actor’s process in relation to feeling, memory, imagination, 
action, and partnered work, and the nature of the relationship between performer 
and audience.
I begin experientially and anecdotally. I want to tell a story. I want to speak 
about failure. At the International Federation for Theatre Research conference in 
summer 2006 in Helsinki, I gave a seminar paper on how cognitive neuroscience 
might let us rethink the conference theme about the nature of the relationship 
between the global and the local in regard to performance. A major problem with 
the paper was that I tried to cover too much in twenty minutes; I tried to be too 
global. But another major problem had to do with being misheard (if I want to place 
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responsibility on others) or with not being clear (if I take responsibility myself); 
I think both were factors. While there were positive responses in the discussion 
period, there were some stark negatives. Following a few tame questions, a woman 
in the audience began by saying, “I have no use for the neuroscience,” and asked a 
question of another panelist. Shortly thereafter the woman sitting beside her said, 
“I too have no use for the neuroscience,” and asked a question of the other panelist. 
Then one my fellow panelists began a response to another question, having nothing 
to do with my paper, with “And I have to say I too have no use for biological 
determinism.” And then my other fellow panelist, in talking about what he was 
trying to theorize, said, “My work is about the self and other as a dynamic, while 
yours seems to present the self as a unitary, isolated, stable entity.” When we talked 
later at a reception, he said, “I use the continental theorists, Lacan, Derrida; unlike 
you, I don’t like the Anglophones, Locke, Hume, you know . . .”
I felt a bit like Alice through the looking glass. I wanted to ask the two women, 
since they had no use for neuroscience and, I’m assuming, cognitive neuroscience, 
which was what I was drawing on, whether they had some use for a brain–and, 
more importantly, what they hoped to accomplish by closing the door to discussion. 
And I wanted to ask my ﬁrst colleague if he thought he’d actually heard the words 
“biological determinism” coming out of my mouth, much less in a positive way, and 
my other colleague if he’d been listening when I was talking about the contingency 
of biology and how the biological ground of the self is shaped powerfully by our 
encounters with the environment, which includes culture and each other, and if he 
truly thought he’d heard me talk about eighteenth century English philosophers (I 
hadn’t, though it could be interesting to think about the historical trajectory of these 
issues in regard to consciousness studies, which is not what I’d been discussing).
Besides my failure to be articulate, I think underlying these encounters were 
a number of anxieties, possibly including a particular kind of anti-science bias 
that feminist cognitive neuroscientist Elizabeth Wilson calls the “anti-essentialist 
essentialism” of some post-modern theories that reject science because it must 
de facto be insufficiently socially theorized and uncritically dependent on 
uncontextualized material observation—a reverse of some scientists’ critiques of 
other disciplines that concentrate on the theoretical or abstract in contradiction 
to material evidence.4 There are anxieties about loss of authority, loss of status, 
insecurities about realizing that we don’t know what we thought we knew, concerns 
that our interpretations of given events or situations might need to be rethought, 
sometimes radically, based on new information. Perhaps a major anxiety has to 
do with the challenges that brain and cognitive sciences present to deﬁnitions of 
identity and self, based on the gross misunderstanding that the science is inevitably 
leading us to an increasingly hypermaterialistic, overdetermined deﬁnition of the 
human, i.e., there will eventually be not only an explanation, but a formula, to 
explain and ultimately control our every feeling, thought, and action, taking away 
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our individuality and freedom, because we are no more than physiological and 
electrochemical processes. The fear is that the science will take away the part of 
us that has choice, that makes art, that makes democracy possible. This is possibly 
the point at which anxieties about the end of theatre—and maybe even humanity, 
for want of a better way of putting it—arise. Interestingly, the science, through 
discovering more about material functions that support consciousness, increasingly 
conﬁrms the complexity and contingency of emotional, cognitive, and behavioral 
processes, which can vary considerably based upon the speciﬁc individual and her 
situation. I repeat:  the science, through discovering more about material functions 
that support consciousness, increasingly conﬁrms the complexity and contingency 
of those processes. The science is not taking away “the human” and, hence, theatre 
and performance; rather, it is providing tools to engage these more closely. Also, 
scientists disagree about their work at least as intensely as we do about ours; as 
in our ﬁelds, there is research, there is argument, there is more research, there is 
more argument, and things change. I could also argue that the speed of substantial 
change in the cognitive neurosciences easily outpaces that in our ﬁelds, which 
makes it challenging for individuals within those disciplines to stay current, and 
even more challenging for those of us using the ﬁndings of those disciplines. Both 
science and performance theory can be abused, e.g., by politicians who distort the 
ﬁndings of scientiﬁc research for political ends or who use the tools of rhetoric 
and performance to manipulate the citizenry, but this denies neither the uses of 
science and performance theory, nor the fact that performance and scientiﬁc memes, 
paradigms, and hard and soft knowledge inform, frame, and sometimes limit how 
we think.
Now, some science. I want to focus on a narrow aspect of research into neural 
systems related to mirroring and simulation. This research has implications for 
theatre and performance particularly in terms of understanding imitation, empathy, 
intention, and the connections not just within, but among, our brains. Though 
scientists disagree about the precise nature of some of the processes I will describe, 
there is agreement that our brains are connected by neural mirroring functions in 
ways that signiﬁcantly affect learning and social relations, and hence art.  I make 
no pretense of being an expert in scientiﬁc matters; my goal is to use science better 
to understand what happens in the studio or in performance. 
In 1996 Iaccomo Rizzolatti and his colleagues at the University of Parma 
published their ﬁndings that monkeys’ brains contain a special class of neurons
that respond to a particular kind of gesture, no matter who is 
making the gesture—the monkey whose brain activity is being 
recorded, or another monkey. If the monkey being recorded 
reaches for a grape, areas in the animal’s prefrontal lobes 
discharge. If another monkey, or even a human, reaches for 
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the grape, the neurons of the monkey observing the action also 
discharge. In short, the neurons mirror both activities of the self 
and activities of others directed at the same goal.5
From the perspective of mirror neurons, or “monkey see, monkey do” neurons, 
watching something is the same as doing something—the same neuron ﬁres. 
Rizzolatti and others have gone on to discover that human brains have a number 
of mirror neuron systems and also simulation neuron systems that allow us to 
understand “not just the actions of others, but their intentions, the social meaning 
of their behavior and their emotions.”6 This does not mean that the brains of the 
one who acts and the one who observes are identical in all respects in the moment 
of action, but rather that particular mirroring and simulation systems are identical; 
there are whole other sets of neurons that ﬁre in the brain of the one who is acting, 
which differentiate the actor from the observer. (There is disagreement about the 
precise function of motor mirror neurons in relationship to non-motor functions such 
as empathy and “reading” intentionality, but this is spurring intensive research into 
these and other kinds of neurons engaged in simulation that seem to let us connect to 
other people.) As Rizzolatti argues, “Mirror neurons allow us to grasp the minds of 
others not through conceptual reasoning but through direct simulation. By feeling, 
not by thinking.”7 The bottom line is that these neural systems connect us to each 
other in concrete ways that were previously unknown.  Some scientists now posit 
that mirror neurons make imitation, and hence language and culture, possible; these 
would not exist without mirror neurons. We learn by looking and copying, e.g., an 
infant will copy a parent sticking out a tongue or making noises as she develops. 
These discoveries have speciﬁc implications for actors, for whom mirroring may 
be at the center of creativity, and for audiences, if we understand that their brains 
are lighting up identically to ours in some regards as we are onstage.
This research provides a new prism through which to view past thinking about 
theatre and performance. The nature of the arguments between Plato and Aristotle 
regarding the power of imitation and of watching gain fresh urgency, in terms of 
both Plato’s warnings about “imbibing the reality” of things imitated and the power 
of watching and Aristotle’s championing of imitation as natural, pleasurable, and 
necessary to learning. Mirror neuron research actually provides support for both, 
acknowledging that, in at least one particular way, we are neurologically bound 
to embody what we watch. These neural systems are another facet of the organic 
ground of mimesis, providing another way to understand the power of imitation, 
empathy, and identiﬁcation. This research provides ground for a new iteration of 
inquiry regarding the power and effect of imitation, particularly related to neural 
patterning and reinforcement. However, it would be wrong to use this research 
moralistically (Platonically?), because of the complexity of the processes and the 
contingency of the interactions between individual and environment. Rather than 
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pushing us closer to the end of theatre, we are being challenged to understand that 
the sources of its power are embedded and embodied in us perhaps more deeply 
than we have ever imagined, and that fundamental questions raised by the two ﬁrst 
theorists of western theatre remain incompletely answered. Moving closer in time 
to ourselves, Diderot’s discussion of the superiority of the actor without feeling 
requires reconsideration, for it now seems that aspects of empathy and simulation 
are fundamental in neural mirroring, and that aspects of imitation are inseparable 
from feeling. There is further evidence for abandoning the polar positions 
taken by Dumesnil and Clairon (“Feeling” vs. “Reason”) and the tired acting 
binary of “inside-out” vs. “outside-in,” of the inwardly/privately psychological 
vs. the observational/externally technical. Neural and cognitive functioning is 
fundamentally relational, about our relationship with the environment, with each 
other. Can we still say there is a hard and fast line between our self and another, if 
my mind is activated identically to yours in some respects when you move your 
hand to reach for something? What in fact are the boundaries between your feelings 
and mine, your actions and mine?
In terms of immediate practical applications for the actor, use of research on 
the neural level is limited; we cannot work with an actor neurally–yet. But it does 
open up new ways of thinking about old issues. Rizzolatti and others assert neural 
mechanisms, including mirror neurons, “allow us to directly understand the meaning 
of the actions and emotions of others [we are observing] by internally replicating 
(‘simulating’) them without any explicit reﬂective mediation,” i.e., conscious 
thought is not involved.8 These simulation mechanisms allow us to “link ‘I do and 
I feel’ with ‘he does and he feels’” directly and provide the basis for us to be able 
to function socially, i.e., in relationship to others. Through neural mirroring, “part 
of our mirror system becomes active ‘as if’ we were executing that very same 
action that we are observing.”9 This directly echoes Stanislavsky’s “if” for the 
actor, even though we are not physically active, and could conceivably be used as 
yet one more argument for challenging the actor to expand her experience–in life, 
in terms of taking in as much as possible in engaging others, and in art, in terms 
of seeing as many superb and innovative performances as possible, i.e., activating 
the simulation and mirroring systems.
Among other things, some neural mirroring systems also allow us to understand 
the intentions of the person we are observing, i.e., we experience not just what 
they are doing, but to some degree what they want, “the ‘why’ of an action”10–what 
actors call motive. Scientists disagree about how involved the motor mirror 
neuron system is in social cognition (see particularly Jacob and Jeannerod, “Motor 
Theory,” and Csibra, “Mirror Neurons”),11 i.e., how accurate it is to nickname 
mirror neurons proper “empathy neurons” or “Dalai Lama neurons,” as some 
have. For example, while Rizzolatti, et al., argue that a mirroring mechanism “is 
also involved in our capacity to understand and experience the emotional states of 
130                                                             Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism
others,” as demonstrated in their research on the neural effects of observing facial 
expressions of disgust,12 Alvin Goldman hypothesizes that there are three kinds of 
mechanism that support mirroring and simulation:  motor mirroring mechanisms, 
general mirroring mechanisms, and simulation mechanisms that work partly at the 
conscious level13; these latter provide linkages among pre- and conscious levels, 
which make them, Goldman argues, “more promising as a unifying basis of social 
cognition.” Regardless, we do know that much of this–whether categorized as 
mirroring or simulation–happens automatically, i.e., pre-consciously.
This work is connected to research on other psychophysical phenomena, such 
as Paul Ekman’s on the relationship between facial expressions and feeling,14 Susana 
Bloch’s on the relationship between posture, breathing patterns, and emotion, 
through her Alba emoting technique for actors,15 and Antonio Damasio’s on, among 
other things, “as-if” body states and emotion, in which imagining a situation causes 
the body to replicate the physiology of being in the actual situation.16 However, 
research on mirroring and simulation goes a step further. In deﬁning brain structures 
“that are active both during [sic] the ﬁrst- and third-person experience of actions 
and emotions,” i.e., “I do/feel” and “he does/feels,” a fundamental physical, not just 
“psychological” “bridge is created between others and ourselves.”17 What it posits 
is an “unmediated resonance,” “a shared direct experiential understanding” between 
individuals:  “By means of a shared neural state realized in two different bodies 
that nevertheless obey to the same morpho-functional rules, the ‘objectual other’ 
becomes ‘another self’” (Gallese, “Intentional Attunement”).18 These could be called 
deﬁnitions of empathy, and they begin to allow us to understand some of the different 
mechanisms by which we identify with and connect to “others.” Indeed, research has 
shown that the absence or defective functioning of mirror neurons is characteristic 
of autistic individuals, who cannot connect socially or empathetically. Scientists 
are also studying prediction and what they call “mind-reading” (i.e., reading the 
state or intention of another person) in regard to mirroring and simulation systems. 
Gergely Csibra hypothesizes that mirror neurons are “involved in the prediction or 
anticipation of subsequent–rather than in the simulation of concurrent–actions of the 
observed individual,”19 possibly making them more accurately named “predictor” 
neurons.  These functions likely underpin some of the most basic acting exercises 
such as the mirror exercise we all do in our beginning acting classes and Meisner’s 
repetition exercise and could, for example, provide new ways of thinking about 
the problem of an actor’s anticipation.
Developments occur almost daily that have profound effects on how we 
understand ourselves. We are connected in ways we cannot yet conceive that allow 
us to imitate each other, empathize with each other, speak with each other, and make 
performances with each other–because our brains are literally ﬁring each other up 
in ways that mirror each other. So what really then is the nature of the boundary 
between ourselves and others, between experience and imagination, between action 
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and emotion, when observing the actions of another person lights up the same set 
of neurons in our head as the one doing the acting? 
We must be open to the use of science in regard to art in this time when 
science and its rigorous application are being resisted politically and culturally by 
too many in the United States. We are duty bound to see and embrace those things 
that constitute nature as fully and honestly as possible. We could do worse than to 
take our cue from Shakespeare:  
Be not too tame neither, but let your own discretion be your 
tutor:  suit the action to the word, the word to the action; with this 
special observance, that you o’erstep not the modesty of nature; 
for anything so overdone is from the purpose of playing, whose 
end, both at the ﬁrst and now, was and is, to hold, as ’twere, the 
mirror up to nature; to show virtue her own feature, scorn her 
own image, and the very age and body of the time his form and 
pressure.20
Part of this nature is that we are biological creatures with consciousness. We 
are constrained by organic processes that unfold in a particular range of ways, 
and we are guided by cultural processes that interact contingently to direct and 
shape those biological processes. Part of the form and pressure of our time is the 
ever-changing impact of science on our lives. As the science increasingly and 
inevitably lets us shape and control the biological, we may have to give up parts 
of comfortable deﬁnitions of what it means to be an actor or an audience member, 
or what a feeling or a memory or a thought or an action is, or even what theatre is. 
We need to reconceive, if only in some small degree for now, our deﬁnitions of the 
relationship between “you” and “me.” We need to reconceive difference. My hope 
is this will free us to be more sensitive and nuanced in the way that we understand 
the actor and the audience, and feeling, memory, and action, and in the way that 
we make and think about theatre.
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